Some background reading: Paulina Borsook - Wikipedia
I don’t know if this article was written by some lame AI or a real human having no technical knowledge on what he is talking about, but claimimg that:
Its approach begins with a Hardware Root of Trust, ensuring devices boot securely and remain tamper-proof
is plain lying (or ignorance?)
There is no product that Purism currently sells or has sold in the past, that have a Hardware root-of-trust. This has been discussed many times on this forum. A hardware root-of-trust for x86/x86_64 is BootGuard and Purism absolutely did not want it - with good reasons in my opinion.
I don’t know of any other hardware-based CRTM for Intel architecture.
There was a FLOSS project from Insurgo (Thierry Laurion) for a hardware R-o-T: FlashKeeper; but it seems stalled…
Possibly it is referring to the TPM. It depends on what you mean by “hardware”.
The TPM can be used for “measurements” of what is executed from bootblock and all firmware modules including blobs - but this is a software root-of-trust: upon reset vector, the bootblock “verifies itself” by hashing into the TPM PCR2 - this is why it is called a SRTM (Static). DRTM (like BootGuard) would call for an external mechanism rooted in hardware before the CPU does its reset and executes its first instruction. With BG, it is essentially the CSME (Intel ME) that does this and validates ACM and IBBs.